AMERICA IS NOT A COMPANY TOWN. STOP SELLING IT LIKE ONE.

JUSTICE · ECONOMIC JUSTICE

Published by Langhorne P. Breedlove

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 2026 · 12:27 AM ET

Tags: Antitrust · Monopoly Power · Competition · Small Business · Worker Rights

Dear fellow American proletariat: There is something wonderfully American about starting a business, competing on merit, hiring neighbors, and building something useful. There is something considerably less wonderful about discovering that your new competitor also owns the wholesaler, the online marketplace, the payment network, and possibly the building in which you had hoped to open your shop.

American Proletariat proposes to break up concentrated corporate power where evidence establishes unlawful monopolization or anticompetitive mergers—and to strengthen the rules that prevent dominant firms from locking up markets in the first place. This is not a proposal to punish a company for being successful, or to declare that every large enterprise is illegal. The relevant questions are what market power a firm possesses, how it obtained or maintains that power, and what remedy restores meaningful competition.

THE MANDATE

Make competition enforceable for consumers, workers, entrepreneurs, independent producers, suppliers, and communities. Strengthen investigations of exclusionary conduct, serial acquisitions, coercive contracting, labor-market monopsony, and mergers that substantially lessen competition. Where liability is demonstrated and narrower remedies cannot restore competition, seek structural separation or divestiture through lawful proceedings. Otherwise pursue targeted conduct remedies, merger prohibitions, restitution where authorized, and ongoing monitoring.

A breakup is a remedy, not an opening insult shouted through a courthouse window. The standard must be evidence, due process, proportionality, and an administrable plan for keeping essential services operating while competition is restored.

ROOTS & HISTORY

Congress enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890. In 1914 it added the Clayton Act and Federal Trade Commission Act, building a legal framework against monopolization, anticompetitive agreements, and mergers that threaten competition. These laws did not prohibit merely growing large. They addressed harmful conduct and market structures under legal standards that courts apply to particular evidence. (Source 01)

The Sherman Act prohibits unreasonable restraints of trade and unlawful monopolization; the Clayton Act addresses mergers and other practices that can substantially lessen competition. The FTC and the Department of Justice share federal antitrust enforcement responsibilities. These are institutions with real statutory authority—not a fantasy Department of Making CEOs Nervous that Congress can create by yelling at a microphone. (Sources 01, 02)

TODAY · WHAT THE EVIDENCE SAYS

The most recent joint Hart–Scott–Rodino annual report, released July 2, 2026, records 2,006 merger transactions reported to federal agencies during fiscal year 2025, with about 31.8% valued above $1 billion. The FTC and DOJ reported 18 merger enforcement actions that year. Those figures describe reviewed notifications and enforcement activity, not proof that the remaining transactions were illegal or that every billion-dollar deal reduces competition. (Source 03)

The 2023 Merger Guidelines describe evidence the agencies evaluate, including significant increases in concentration, lost potential competition, threats to rivals' access to crucial inputs, and cumulative acquisition patterns. Guidelines explain enforcement analysis; they do not replace the statutes or bind federal judges as law. (Source 04)

Competition also matters in labor markets. A buyer that controls too many employers' alternatives may have power to depress compensation or restrict mobility even if the checkout price looks wonderfully low. Antitrust analysis must therefore examine hiring markets as well as consumer prices, supplier terms, innovation, quality, and the practical possibility of starting a rival business. (Sources 02, 04)

THE LEGAL PATH

The existing Sherman and Clayton Acts permit government challenges to unlawful conduct and mergers through statutory processes, with judicial remedies conditioned on the facts. Congress can change enforcement resources, reporting thresholds, procedural safeguards, penalties, and substantive statutes, subject to constitutional limits. The FTC and DOJ cannot simply divide a company because it is unpopular, and AP should never pretend they can. (Sources 01, 02)

A structural order must specify the relevant market, demonstrated violation, assets or business units to be separated, protections for customers and workers, and post-divestiture supervision. Merger challenges should occur before integration whenever practicable; reversing a completed acquisition can be more disruptive and legally difficult.

THE PLAN

01 · MAP THE MARKETS

Create a transparent enforcement priority system using concentration measures, entry barriers, repeat acquisition patterns, pricing evidence, employer and buyer power, interoperability restrictions, and credible complaints. Publish methods and protect confidential business information. A high market share alone is a reason to investigate, not an automatic guilty verdict.

02 · STOP THE HARMFUL DEALS BEFORE THEY CLOSE

Strengthen capacity to review mergers, including acquisitions of nascent rivals and successive small targets. Examine the total acquisition history where legally relevant, and require clear evidence of claimed efficiencies. Consider special protections for markets where a merger could foreclose access to indispensable networks, logistics, data, or infrastructure.

03 · RESTORE COMPETITION WHEN THE LAW IS VIOLATED

Seek injunctions, structural divestiture, carefully enforceable conduct remedies, or other available relief based on demonstrated anticompetitive harm. Establish independent compliance reporting and revisit remedies when new competitors still cannot enter. Avoid replacing a private monopoly with a divested company that remains controlled by the same interests through concealed agreements.

04 · GIVE SMALL FIRMS AND WORKERS ROOM TO BREATHE

Expand practical access to complaint channels, procurement opportunities, and technical guidance. Examine restrictive noncompete arrangements and no-poach agreements according to applicable law, while protecting legitimate trade secrets and contractual rights. Require prompt, accessible remedies when conduct is unlawful; a five-year lawsuit is not much use to a business with five weeks of cash.

05 · DEFEND INDEPENDENT ENFORCEMENT

Fund skilled economists, litigators, technical experts, and regional investigators. Mandate transparent priorities, independent audits, judicial review, and disclosures of conflicts. Political leaders can set lawful priorities without turning enforcement into a weapon against personal enemies.

THE TEN-YEAR LEDGER

YEAR ONE · ESTIMATE PENDING. Set an enacted-law baseline for FTC and DOJ competition enforcement, then calculate incremental investigation staff, litigation, economists, technical systems, regional access, and independent evaluation. Identify fees, appropriations, litigation recovery where legally available, and potential budget effects separately. A court-imposed divestiture is not an automatic federal revenue stream.

YEARS TWO THROUGH TEN · ESTIMATE PENDING. Project annual operating and transition expenses, case duration, court-ordered remedy monitoring, merger review volumes, and plausible effects on tax receipts, procurement costs, wages, prices, productivity, and investment. Model low, middle, and high scenarios and record uncertainty. Any claimed consumer savings must identify affected markets and credible comparisons; do not book the same estimated benefit both as lower prices and as fresh Treasury cash.

Some antitrust remedies could impose transition costs on affected companies, customers, and workers, while others may improve market entry, wages, quality, or innovation. A serious model reports these separately rather than advertising an imaginary net profit from breaking up everything with a corporate logo.

WHAT COULD GO WRONG?

Large firms sometimes achieve genuine economies of scale, dependable logistics, integrated research, and lower unit costs. Splitting them can sacrifice efficiencies or temporarily disrupt services. Misidentifying a relevant market can make a strong company look monopolistic when customers have alternatives, or conceal monopoly power in a narrow local labor market. Courts may reject inadequate evidence, overbroad theories, or remedies that do not fit established law.

Political retaliation is another danger. Antitrust must not become a tool for breaking up businesses because executives supported the wrong candidate or published an irritating editorial. Public evidence, neutral procedural standards, independent adjudication, and appeal rights are protections for everyone—including those AP strongly disagrees with.

MEASURING SUCCESS

Track entry and exit of competing firms; market concentration with clearly defined geographic and product boundaries; wages and worker mobility; consumer price, quality, and service outcomes; supplier bargaining conditions; innovation indicators; remedy compliance; case duration; and government costs. Compare outcomes against credible counterfactuals rather than celebrating an enforcement press release as though it were proof that grocery prices fell.

THE POINT

A country with thriving businesses needs businesses that can compete. It also needs consumers who can leave, workers who can change employers, suppliers who can negotiate, and entrepreneurs who do not have to kiss a gatekeeper's ring before opening their doors.

American Proletariat's test is neither 'big is bad' nor 'whatever is profitable must be good.' The test is whether power has been accumulated or used unlawfully to shut out competition—and whether our remedy restores the freedom to build, buy, work, and walk away. The antitrust laws are already on the books. We propose giving them the evidence, capacity, and accountability needed to do their job.

E pluribus unum, bitches.

SOURCES & FURTHER READING

01 · Federal Trade Commission — The Antitrust Laws: Sherman Act, Clayton Act and FTC Act, official legal overview. https://www.ftc.gov/advice-guidance/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws

02 · U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division — The Antitrust Laws, enforcement and legal standards. https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-laws-and-you

03 · U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission — Fiscal Year 2025 Hart–Scott–Rodino Annual Report, released July 2, 2026. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/doj-and-ftc-issue-fiscal-year-2025-hart-scott-rodino-annual-report

04 · U.S. Department of Justice — 2023 Merger Guidelines: Overview and analytical frameworks, December 2023. https://www.justice.gov/atr/merger-guidelines/overview

05 · Federal Trade Commission — Clayton Act, statutory reference, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27. https://www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/statutes/clayton-act

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WE ARE ONE.  ·  E PLURIBUS UNUM.