JUSTICE · RACIAL JUSTICE
Published by | Langhorne P. Breedlove
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 2026 · 12:52 AM ET
Tags: Latin America · Caribbean · Sovereignty · Nonintervention · Trade · Self-Determination
Dear fellow American proletariat: A neighbor is not a subordinate simply because your house is bigger. You do not get to appoint their mayor, supervise their elections, rewrite their mortgage and call the arrangement a friendship. The United States has spent more than two centuries negotiating, trading and cooperating with the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean—and, at documented moments, treating their political independence as an inconvenience.
American Proletariat proposes a foreign policy that respects the self-determination of Latin American and Caribbean peoples, rejects unlawful intervention and supports equitable regional cooperation. Sovereignty belongs to the people and lawful institutions of each country, not to Washington, foreign creditors, multinational companies or any other government that fancies itself the adult in the room.
AP proposes that the United States renounce unilateral coercive regime change; strengthen scrutiny of military, intelligence and economic operations; support transparent, mutually agreed trade and infrastructure partnerships; examine the harms of historical interventions; and defend human rights without claiming the power to choose another country's government. These are proposals to change U.S. policy, not assertions that every current treaty or sanction is unlawful.
The mandate must distinguish the sovereign rights of independent Latin American and Caribbean states from the different constitutional questions facing Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and from the relationships of independent Caribbean states and overseas territories governed by other countries. Neither language nor geography establishes one identical legal status for everyone in the region.
President James Monroe's December 1823 annual message warned European powers against further colonization in the Americas. The doctrine initially addressed European involvement; it was not a treaty inviting Latin American republics to surrender sovereignty to the United States. (Source 01)
In his December 6, 1904 message to Congress, President Theodore Roosevelt expanded that approach, claiming a U.S. role exercising an international police power in certain Western Hemisphere circumstances. The Roosevelt Corollary subsequently helped justify U.S. interventions in Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. In the 1930s, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy rejected the earlier interventionist posture. (Source 02)
The Cold War added further chapters. Declassified U.S. records describe CIA planning and operations against Guatemala's elected president Jacobo Árbenz in 1953–1954; Árbenz resigned on June 27, 1954, after an armed invasion, psychological operations and diplomatic pressure. This is documented state activity, not a theory inferred from a mysterious photograph. (Source 03)
In Chile, a September 16, 1973 CIA memorandum recorded $6,476,166 in approved covert support since January 1971 for opposition political parties, media and private-sector organizations. The State Department's historical account says U.S. covert involvement is documented while direct U.S. support for General Augusto Pinochet's September 1973 coup remains a separate disputed question; one should not claim the documentary record proves more than it does. (Sources 04, 05)
Latin America and the Caribbean contain countries with different constitutions, populations, languages, economic structures, security challenges and relationships with the United States. The World Bank's October 6, 2026 regional outlook projected 2.2% growth for 2026, compared with 2.4% in 2025, and emphasized variation among countries. Those are regional aggregates, not a verdict on every national economy. (Source 06)
Regional cooperation already exists. The 1973 Treaty of Chaguaramas established the Caribbean Community, CARICOM, to coordinate economic integration, foreign policy and other shared objectives. The treaty reflects cooperation chosen by participating governments, not an entitlement for the United States to supervise them. (Source 07)
International law establishes another starting point. Article 2 of the United Nations Charter recognizes sovereign equality and prohibits the threat or use of force inconsistent with the Charter. Article 19 of the Organization of American States Charter rejects direct and indirect intervention in another state's internal or external affairs, while Article 20 addresses coercive economic and political measures. Applying these rules requires the full treaty context and relevant exceptions, not simply citing a slogan. (Sources 08, 09)
Contemporary disputes over migration, organized crime, corruption, trade, climate displacement, sovereign debt and foreign investment create legitimate concerns for neighboring countries. But national-security concerns cannot be a permanent blank check for secrecy or domination. Effective regional security also requires competent local institutions, rights-respecting policing, credible courts and cooperative investigations.
The president directs diplomacy and exercises significant foreign-affairs authority within constitutional and statutory limits. Congress controls appropriations, regulates foreign commerce, establishes sanctions statutes and conducts oversight; international agreements and security cooperation have their own approval and implementation requirements. A lawful new course must identify which measures can change through executive policy and which require legislation, treaty action or negotiations with partner governments.
The United Nations and OAS charters are relevant legal frameworks, not universal vetoes against lawful collective security, authorized sanctions or international judicial processes. The project must distinguish unlawful coercion from sanctions authorized under applicable law, human-rights advocacy, diplomatic criticism and assistance offered with legitimate local consent. (Sources 08, 09)
Review declassification opportunities and publicly account for historical U.S. military, intelligence and economic interventions, subject to appropriate source protections and legal constraints. Establish a factual record before designing apology, restitution or repair proposals. The archive cannot fix history; it can at least stop the government from pretending that history misplaced its own paperwork.
Require rigorous legal review and congressional oversight for security assistance, intelligence operations and sanctions. Reject covert manipulation of elections and unilateral efforts to install favored governments. Keep emergency and collective-security authorities within actual law, with independent reporting on their use and consequences.
Negotiate transparent investment, procurement and development agreements with labor, environmental and anti-corruption safeguards. Examine debt sustainability, locally retained economic value and access for smaller enterprises. Let partner states choose their development priorities; do not impose a tidy Washington blueprint on economies that have their own governments and citizens.
Work with CARICOM, the Organization of American States and relevant development institutions without treating them as subsidiaries of U.S. policy. Support disaster preparedness, hurricane resilience, public health, research, education and infrastructure when requested and mutually agreed. Protect the independent political choices of participating states.
Review the roles of violence, persecution, economic shocks, environmental disasters and previous foreign-policy choices in migration. Pair legitimate border management with asylum obligations, due process and cooperative development. Neither migrants nor the countries they leave should be reduced to props in domestic electoral theater.
The financial baseline must distinguish existing State Department and USAID assistance, development-finance activities, security cooperation, sanctions administration, international financial-institution commitments and defense operations. These programs have different purposes and accounting structures; renaming them does not create savings. Nor can a proposed historical repair payment be called funded before its legal basis, recipients and valuation are identified.
For year one, estimate diplomatic negotiations, legal review, records declassification, independent investigations, program staff, pilot partnerships and administrative transition. Over ten fiscal years, show the costs of revised development and climate programs, treaty commitments, debt restructuring where applicable, private capital mobilized, offsets from specifically discontinued programs, and uncertainty in revenue or national-security effects.
Any proposed restitution must have transparent eligibility, causal evidence, consultation with affected governments and populations, safeguards against corrupt diversion and an appropriation or other lawful funding mechanism. The first-year net cost and ten-year fiscal balance are undetermined because program scope, negotiated partners and funding mechanisms are not yet specified. Publishing invented savings would be another form of financial imperialism, only with worse arithmetic.
A nonintervention commitment cannot mean ignoring serious human-rights abuses, trafficking, violence or threats to peace. Governments may claim sovereignty while repressing their own residents; foreign corporations and criminal organizations may exploit weak oversight; regional leaders may disagree on trade, sanctions, migration and democratic standards. Respect for national self-determination must coexist with principled, lawful international cooperation.
Critics of reduced U.S. coercive pressure argue that sanctions, security partnerships and conditional aid can deter abuses or aggression. Critics of intervention point to civilian harms, political backlash and the historical record of failed or abusive operations. AP should evaluate particular measures on evidence, legality, local consent, unintended consequences and alternative options rather than treating every instance of cooperation—or pressure—as identical.
Debt relief or development assistance can fail if it rewards corrupt intermediaries, undermines repayment systems or neglects fiscal sustainability. Regional integration can produce benefits while generating distributional costs between industries and countries. A partnership ethic requires honoring these complications, not congratulating ourselves for saying 'sovereignty' in a very firm voice.
Track publicly disclosed security operations, compliance with international obligations, documented civilian harm, regional consultation, treaty implementation, dispute resolution, locally controlled development investment, labor and environmental outcomes, debt sustainability, aid transparency, migration protections and independent assessments by affected communities. Report country-by-country results rather than laundering regional averages into national success stories.
The measure of a good neighbor is not whether every neighbor votes the way you wish. It is whether their independence survives disagreement with you. America can defend its legitimate interests without confusing the Western Hemisphere with its personal backyard. A free country should know the difference.
01 · U.S. National Archives — Monroe Doctrine, President James Monroe's Annual Message, December 2, 1823. https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/monroe-doctrine
02 · U.S. National Archives — Theodore Roosevelt's Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, Annual Message, December 6, 1904. https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/roosevelt-corollary
03 · U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States — CIA Role in the Overthrow of Árbenz, memorandum prepared May 12, 1975. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d287
04 · U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States — Memorandum from CIA Director William Colby to Henry Kissinger, September 16, 1973. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve16/d145
05 · U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian — The Allende Years and the Pinochet Coup, 1969–1973. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/allende
06 · World Bank — Latin America and the Caribbean Economic Update, October 6, 2026. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2026/10/06/latin-america-caribbean-economic-update
07 · Caribbean Community (CARICOM) — Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, signed July 4, 1973. https://caricom.org/treaties/treaty-establishing-the-caribbean-community/
08 · United Nations — Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I, signed June 26, 1945. https://www.un.org/about-us/un-charter/chapter-1
09 · Organization of American States — Charter of the OAS, Articles 17–20, current treaty text. https://www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/inter_american_treaties_A-41_charter_OAS.asp
WE ARE ONE. · E PLURIBUS UNUM.