THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE IS NOT SOMEONE ELSE’S BACKYARD.

VAULT · 08 BORDERS, BOMBS & BAD DECISIONS

Published by Langhorne P. Breedlove

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 2026 · 2:43 AM ET

Tags: Sovereignty · Latin America · Caribbean · Nonintervention · Regional Autonomy · Diplomacy

Dear fellow American proletariat: The United States has spent generations describing Latin America and the Caribbean as its neighborhood, market, strategic perimeter and sphere of influence. Those expressions can make the people who actually govern and inhabit the region sound like scenery. A neighbor is not a tenant, and geographic proximity does not confer a deed to another nation's future.

This essay examines the legal and practical meaning of sovereignty, the record of U.S. intervention, territorial self-determination, trade and financial leverage, and regional cooperation. American Proletariat's proposed approach is grounded in consent, lawful diplomacy and respect for governments and peoples capable of making their own choices. Those are proposals to evaluate, not a claim that every state or government in the hemisphere has an equally democratic or rights-respecting record.

ROOTS · THE HISTORY OF INTERVENTION

In 1823 President James Monroe announced opposition to further European colonization and interference in the Americas. Later U.S. governments interpreted hemispheric interests far more expansively. Theodore Roosevelt's 1904 corollary asserted an American role in intervention under certain conditions. Neither nineteenth-century presidential doctrine nor a twentieth-century foreign-policy slogan supersedes contemporary international legal obligations. (Source 01)

The historical record includes direct military occupations, covert operations, pressure on elected governments, and support for particular regimes. One documented example is the 1954 CIA operation PBSUCCESS that helped remove Guatemalan president Jacobo Árbenz. The Department of State's official Foreign Relations series retrospectively published extensive records of the U.S. role. The existence of a documented intervention does not prove every later crisis in Guatemala had a single cause, but it rules out pretending the operation was merely a rumor. (Source 02)

THE LEGAL BASELINE

SOVEREIGN EQUALITY & THE USE OF FORCE

Article 2 of the United Nations Charter recognizes sovereign equality, requires peaceful settlement of disputes and prohibits threats or uses of force against another state's territorial integrity or political independence except as permitted by the Charter's framework. This leaves legally important questions involving self-defense and Security Council authorization; the rule is not an unlimited permission to use force whenever a government calls an issue urgent. (Source 03)

THE INTER-AMERICAN RULE OF NONINTERVENTION

Articles 19 and 20 of the Organization of American States Charter reject direct or indirect intervention and coercive political or economic measures designed to force another state's sovereign will. The same regional framework addresses representative democracy, human rights, collective security and peaceful dispute resolution. Respect for sovereignty therefore does not require silence about repression, nor does condemnation of repression automatically authorize invasion. (Source 04)

THE REGION IS NOT A SINGLE COUNTRY

Latin America and the Caribbean encompass sovereign republics, constitutional monarchies, dependencies, overseas territories and self-governing jurisdictions under different arrangements. Languages, trade patterns, Indigenous nations, Afro-descendant communities, economies, political institutions and relationships with the United States vary widely. Regional autonomy must leave room for these differences instead of demanding a single political alignment.

CARICOM describes itself as a Caribbean integration organization bringing together sovereign member states and associate members. Its work addresses regional coordination and challenges associated with small economies, natural disasters and external shocks. A 2026 CARICOM information package lists fifteen full members and six associate members; older website sections have inconsistent associate-member counts, so any current inventory should use a dated official list. CARICOM is not a U.S. instrument and must remain directed by its own members. (Source 05)

PUERTO RICO & OTHER NON-SOVEREIGN TERRITORIES

Puerto Rico has been under U.S. sovereignty since 1898 and remains a U.S. territory under a distinct constitutional and statutory framework. Its residents have debated statehood, independence, free association and existing territorial arrangements through multiple plebiscites. A June 2024 Congressional Research Service report explains that a status change ultimately requires federal action and must account for Puerto Rican political choices. The United States cannot simply announce that a territory is 'independent' without resolving citizenship, finance, federal property, legal obligations and the process of consent. (Source 06)

The U.S. Virgin Islands and other Caribbean jurisdictions have different constitutional and political relationships. A fair approach would examine each separately, including local consultation and status options, rather than treat territories as overseas administrative branches with no voice in their futures.

CUBA, HAITI & THE LIMITS OF EASY ANSWERS

CUBA · SANCTIONS ARE LAW, NOT JUST A SPEECH

U.S. sanctions involving Cuba rely on multiple statutes, executive orders and Treasury regulations. In 2026 the Treasury Department issued additional sanctions authorities and regulatory changes, including the May 1 executive order and September amendments. Any proposal to lift, narrow or redesign these measures must distinguish what the president can modify under delegated authority from restrictions Congress enacted. Humanitarian exemptions and licenses also need precise review; a political preference cannot repeal statutory restrictions by itself. (Source 07)

HAITI · ASSISTANCE WITHOUT SUBSTITUTING FOREIGN RULE

Haiti's security, displacement and governance crises require careful differentiation among Haitian institutions, armed groups, international missions and humanitarian agencies. Regional or international assistance should be assessed against lawful authorization, Haitian participation, civilian protection, accountability and a defined exit strategy. Respecting sovereignty does not require abandoning people facing violence; helping people does not entitle foreign governments to administer Haiti indefinitely. (Sources 08, 09)

ECONOMIC SOVEREIGNTY & DEVELOPMENT

The Congressional Research Service's May 2026 assessment describes U.S. hemispheric policy as combining security, trade, migration, democracy, human-rights and great-power competition interests. These priorities can conflict. A government may seek lawful cooperation on trafficking or disaster response while rejecting trade conditions, military presence or debt terms it views as intrusive. Economic relationships require actual negotiated terms, not proclamations that friendship entitles one party to set the other's budget. (Source 08)

Public lending, development finance, resource extraction and trade arrangements should be transparent about interest, repayment, procurement, environmental effects, labor rights and distribution of benefits. Reforms could favor competitive procurement, debt transparency, local capacity and independent assessment of projects. This is not an argument that every foreign investment is exploitation or that every government borrowing choice is wise.

A FIVE-PART REFORM FRAMEWORK

ONE · REVIEW HISTORICAL & CURRENT U.S. ACTIONS

Create a declassification and public-record review of significant interventions, covert actions, assistance programs, sanctions and security partnerships, prioritizing documented questions and protecting legitimate sources and privacy. Publish timelines, legal authority and errors corrected. Historical responsibility requires evidence rather than accusations unsupported by records.

TWO · REQUIRE CLEAR LEGAL AUTHORITY

For proposed military actions, sanctions and coercive measures, publicly identify relevant domestic authorization and international-law basis, subject to lawful confidentiality. Congress should examine statutory delegations and oversight while executive agencies document necessity, scope and civilian effects. Review procedures cannot manufacture authority that neither Congress nor international law provides.

THREE · SUPPORT REGION-LED COOPERATION

Work through voluntary agreements and existing regional institutions, including CARICOM, the OAS and relevant development bodies, with partner governments defining priorities. Disaster preparedness, hurricane resilience, public health, shipping, food systems, energy reliability and crime prevention may benefit from regional coordination. A partner's decision not to participate must remain meaningful.

FOUR · PROTECT RIGHTS WITHOUT IMPOSING RULE

Support independent human-rights reporting, credible election observation by agreement, judicial cooperation where legally available, refugee protection, and civilian safeguards. Avoid equating a government's criticism of U.S. policy with proof of human-rights abuse; equally, do not excuse actual abuse because a government opposes U.S. intervention. Apply documented standards consistently.

FIVE · NEGOTIATE TERRITORIAL & ECONOMIC QUESTIONS OPENLY

Treat political-status questions, debt agreements, treaty obligations and regional investments through lawful mechanisms with affected governments and populations. Identify options, fiscal effects, citizenship or migration consequences, transition arrangements, and dispute resolution. Do not promise that one universal formula can resolve every island's or country's history.

THE ONE-YEAR & TEN-YEAR LEDGER

A change in foreign policy is not automatically a budget saving. Sanctions reviews, diplomatic staffing, historical archives, disaster finance, development assistance and territorial status negotiations have different cost centers. Existing appropriations and loan commitments must form the baseline; transfers between agencies should not count as savings. A legislative estimate must also separate U.S. fiscal costs from economic effects on partner countries.

For an illustrative diplomatic-and-records initiative, assume 200 specialists at an average fully loaded annual cost of $225,000, giving $45 million in personnel, plus $35 million per year in translation, secure archives, independent assessment and partner consultations. Recurring annual gross cost would be $80 million. Assume $40 million in one-time setup and systems costs. The first year would equal $120 million; ten years at unchanged operating costs plus startup would equal $840 million undiscounted. These are mathematical planning assumptions, not a congressional cost estimate, a foreign-aid request or a forecast of savings.

A separate hypothetical $250 million annual competitive regional cooperation fund would total $2.5 billion over ten flat years before administration, disbursement delays or inflation. Actual authorizations must specify eligibility, partner contributions, grants versus loans, credit subsidy costs, auditing, debt sustainability, procurement safeguards and the handling of unsuccessful projects. No claimed savings from avoided conflict, reduced migration or expanded trade should be entered as certain federal receipts without defensible evidence.

WHAT COULD GO WRONG?

A nonintervention policy may be interpreted too broadly and become an excuse to disregard atrocities or ignore treaty obligations. Security cooperation may conceal unlawful operations or strengthen abusive institutions. Foreign assistance can create dependencies, corruption risks or politically favored contractors. Rapid sanctions changes can produce unintended distributional effects and legal disputes. Territorial-status transitions may divide affected populations and trigger difficult questions over citizenship, debt and public services.

Critics may prioritize regional security, countering hostile state influence and safeguarding trade; proponents of greater regional autonomy may emphasize past U.S. interventions, sovereign consent and the harms of coercion. Each question deserves a country-specific legal and empirical account. Sovereignty should not be a label used to excuse aggression by any government, including governments located in the region itself.

HOW WE WILL KNOW

Publish the legal bases for U.S. regional actions; the status of declassification reviews; partner-led agreements; project performance and procurement audits; changes in humanitarian access; verified civilian protection concerns; debt terms; environmental and labor safeguards; and the fiscal ledger of each program. Evaluate regional projects with participating governments, independent researchers and affected communities while protecting legitimate confidential records.

THE POINT

Latin America and the Caribbean are not an American administrative district. Their governments and peoples have the right to choose political arrangements under applicable law and to negotiate cooperation on terms that preserve sovereignty, rights and mutual accountability. The United States can pursue legitimate security, trade and humanitarian interests without treating proximity as ownership.

Good neighbors respect property lines. Great powers ought to manage at least that much courtesy.

SOURCES & FURTHER READING

01 · U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian — The Roosevelt Corollary and the Monroe Doctrine, historical overview.

https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/roosevelt-and-monroe-doctrine

02 · U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian — Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Guatemala, retrospective volume (2003).

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat

03 · United Nations — Charter of the United Nations, Articles 1–2.

https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text

04 · Organization of American States — Charter of the OAS, Articles 3, 19 and 20.

https://www.oas.org/juridico/english/charter.html

05 · Caribbean Community — CARICOM Member States and Associate Members; 2026 information package.

https://caricom.org/wp-content/uploads/CARICOM-Info-Package-2026.pdf

06 · Congressional Research Service — Political Status of Puerto Rico: Brief Background and Recent Developments for Congress, June 6, 2024.

https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R44721/R44721.8.pdf

07 · U.S. Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control — Cuba Sanctions, legal framework and 2026 regulatory updates.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/cuba-sanctions

08 · Congressional Research Service — U.S. Foreign Policy in the Western Hemisphere: Issues for Congress, May 26, 2026.

https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R48960.html

09 · Organization of American States — Inter-American Democratic Charter; cooperative regional democracy framework.

https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/democraticcharter.asp

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WE ARE ONE.  ·  E PLURIBUS UNUM.