A PRISON SENTENCE SHOULD NOT BE A REVENUE STREAM.

VAULT · JUSTICE AGAINST THE EPSTEINERS

Published by Langhorne P. Breedlove

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 2026 · 2:21 AM ET

Tags: Private Prisons · Rehabilitation · Prison Education · Reentry · Public Safety · Corrections Oversight

Dear fellow American proletariat: If a hospital gets paid to keep its patients sick, we would have some questions. If a prison operator earns revenue for every occupied bed, perhaps we ought to have a few questions there, too. A sentence imposed by a court is an exercise of public authority. Whether a private contractor should profit from carrying it out is a legitimate constitutional, financial and moral debate. But a contract's profit motive alone does not tell us everything about safety, cost or rehabilitation.

This VAULT essay examines how for-profit prison contracts developed, what the evidence says about conditions and costs, why government programs already recognize rehabilitation, and what a lawful transition toward publicly accountable corrections would require. American Proletariat's linked Justice policy proposes ending private for-profit prison contracts. The investigation must distinguish that proposal from what federal and state law already requires.

THE PUBLIC POWER BEHIND A PRIVATE CONTRACT

A privately operated prison does not create its own criminal sentences. Government courts, statutes and correctional authorities determine who is lawfully confined, while private firms may be paid to operate a facility or provide contracted services. In the 1980s the federal Bureau of Prisons began using privately managed institutions for certain populations, ultimately contracting for as many as 15 facilities housing approximately 29,000 people at one point (Source 01). That history should not be confused with the much larger state corrections system.

The Justice Department's inspector general reviewed federal contract prisons in 2016 and identified more safety and security incidents in several categories than at comparable BOP institutions, while also identifying deficiencies in the agency's monitoring of contracts (Source 02). These were findings from particular institutions and periods, not a controlled finding that every privately managed facility will invariably have worse results than every publicly managed one.

WHAT CHANGED IN WASHINGTON—AND WHAT DIDN'T

On January 26, 2021, President Joe Biden issued Executive Order 14006, directing the Attorney General not to renew Justice Department contracts with privately operated criminal detention facilities, consistent with law (Source 03). The Bureau of Prisons announced that its final secure private-prison contract ended November 30, 2022 (Source 01). That was a real federal operational change, not a nationwide abolition of private detention.

President Donald Trump revoked Executive Order 14006 on January 20, 2025, through Executive Order 14148 (Source 04). Revoking the order did not itself establish that every previous contract was reinstated. Nor did the earlier order eliminate state private prisons, local jail contracts, immigration-detention arrangements or all privately operated reentry facilities. These operate under different legal authorities and funding arrangements.

The Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that 88,618 people under state or federal correctional jurisdiction were held in privately operated prisons at year-end 2023, roughly 7.1% of the jurisdiction population. The same federal statistical table separately listed 65,552 people held in local jails under state or federal prison jurisdiction (Source 05). Those categories must not be casually added and described as a single private-prison population.

DO PRIVATE PRISONS ACTUALLY SAVE MONEY?

Claims about cost are among the easiest to exaggerate. A Government Accountability Office review found that the Bureau of Prisons lacked sufficient information to make a methodologically sound comparison of private and public low- and minimum-security facilities. A legitimate comparison must account for security level, population, location, health needs, service quality, financing and comparable operating expenses (Source 06). A lower contract rate is not necessarily a lower total public cost if medical services, oversight, transportation or post-release consequences have been omitted.

The opposite claim also requires evidence: paying a public employee rather than a contractor does not automatically make a facility safer or less expensive. Public prisons can suffer understaffing, violence, neglect, deficient healthcare and institutional failure. A sound reform compares specific outcomes and establishes enforceable minimums regardless of ownership.

REHABILITATION IS ALREADY PART OF FEDERAL LAW

Congress enacted the First Step Act on December 21, 2018. Among other changes, it expanded federal recidivism-reduction programming and created earned-time-credit opportunities for eligible people participating in qualifying activities (Source 07). Eligibility is not universal, and credits are not an automatic pardon or a license to disregard court-imposed sentences.

Federal implementation has been imperfect. In January 2026, GAO found that the Bureau of Prisons did not complete all required risk and needs assessments on time. In a cohort of 57,902 people entering BOP facilities from June 2022 through March 2024, about 75% received timely initial risk assessments. GAO also found that many people potentially eligible for transfer to prerelease custody had not received application of all earned credits when expected (Source 08). A rehabilitation promise only works when the agency can administer it.

The Bureau of Prisons updated its time-credit regulation effective September 30, 2026, including clarification of when credits begin accruing (Source 09). That illustrates why corrections reforms require continuing statutory, judicial and administrative attention rather than a single ceremonial signing.

EDUCATION IS NOT A DECORATION FOR THE PRISON BROCHURE

A 2013 RAND meta-analysis commissioned through federal justice research reviewed correctional education and found that incarcerated participants had 43% lower odds of recidivating than nonparticipants in the studies with the most rigorous designs (Source 10). Lower odds are not the same as a 43-percentage-point reduction in reoffending, and findings from earlier study populations do not establish identical effects for every modern program.

Education, vocational training, literacy, addiction treatment, mental-health care, family connections and suitable housing may serve different needs. Rehabilitation should respond to individually assessed risks and circumstances. The public deserves to know which programs actually produce credentials, employment, sustained recovery and better safety outcomes—not simply how many pamphlets the prison ordered.

WHAT WOULD PUBLICLY ACCOUNTABLE CORRECTIONS MEAN?

One model would phase out for-profit contracts for secure criminal imprisonment as terms expire, with lawful safeguards for transfer, staffing, care and capacity. Another would restrict certain contract practices, require public ownership of facilities or reserve public operation for functions involving force and discipline. Each has distinct legal implications. A policy should specify whether nonprofit operators, community reentry organizations, contracted healthcare providers and immigration detention are included or separately regulated.

Rehabilitation-centered corrections could establish enforceable medical and mental-health standards, meaningful education and work credentials, family contact, independent inspections, safe staffing, grievance protections, substance-use care, reentry preparation and continuity of services after release. The goal is neither to ignore serious crimes nor to make punishment dependent on a company's occupancy projections. Sentencing, public safety and prison operations remain separate questions.

WHO HAS THE POWER TO CHANGE IT?

Congress can set restrictions on federal criminal-detention contracts, appropriations and standards within constitutional limits. State legislatures and correctional departments generally control state prison contracting and facilities. Local authorities administer many jails; immigration detention and contracted residential reentry services must be separately assessed under their own statutes. Neither a federal executive order nor a Justice Department procurement policy can directly repeal every lawful state contract.

Any transition must account for labor agreements, lease and bond obligations, procurement law, facility ownership, staffing and safe movement of incarcerated people. Abolition of a contract must not become abandonment of the people presently held under it. Responsible public administration must have capacity ready before a facility closes.

THE ONE-YEAR & TEN-YEAR LEDGER

A budget-ready model requires facility-by-facility contract prices, actual public operating costs, occupancy, security classifications, staffing, healthcare, transportation, infrastructure, lease and debt obligations, litigation, training, reentry investments and existing baseline appropriations. It must identify state versus federal expenditures and test whether any claimed savings are new, recurring or merely shifted to another agency.

For illustration only, suppose 5,000 people must move from expiring private contracts to suitable public facilities. If the incremental public cost were an assumed $8,000 per person-year, that would add $40 million per year; assume another $60 million in first-year transition, hiring and infrastructure costs. The hypothetical first-year gross increase is $100 million. If the $40 million incremental annual cost persisted in each of the remaining nine years with no further transition expense, the flat ten-year increase would total $460 million. These are invented comparison inputs, not an observed public-versus-private cost differential or endorsed appropriation.

A credible fiscal ledger would present alternatives: public operation in existing capacity; construction or renovation; nonprofit provision of suitable noncustodial services; and reductions in incarceration through lawful sentencing or diversion reforms. Any projected lower recidivism and avoided future incarceration must use defensible causal evidence, a specified comparison group and a clear timeline. Savings cannot be booked once as a prison budget reduction and again as a separate benefit to the Treasury.

WHAT COULD GO WRONG?

A rushed contract termination could exceed available public capacity, disrupt medication or treatment, move people far from families, destabilize employment, or expose governments to litigation. New public facilities may cost more and still fail to rehabilitate. Programs designed only around completion certificates can produce little lasting benefit. Some incarcerated people present serious risks and require secure, professionally operated custody even in a rehabilitation-centered system.

Supporters of ending for-profit custody point to incentives, transparency, oversight and documented contract-prison problems. Opponents cite capacity flexibility, public expense and the potential value of specialized providers. Both positions require matched comparisons, a feasible transition and explicit service standards. Private profit is a policy concern; public ownership alone is not proof of safe or humane conditions.

MEASURING SUCCESS

Publish independent inspection findings, deaths and serious injuries, medical wait times, staff vacancies, use of force, grievances resolved, education and credential completion, substance-use treatment, family contact, recidivism measured over defined periods, employment and housing after release, costs per person-year and the actual budget effect of contract changes. Compare institutions with similar populations and security needs.

A prison cannot guarantee that every person will leave rehabilitated. It can be required to provide safe custody, lawful treatment, meaningful opportunities for change and transparent oversight. When someone returns to the community, the public should have more to show for the sentence than an invoice. Accountability ought to follow the person out of the gate—and follow the government that held the keys.

RELATED JUSTICE MANDATES

End Private For-Profit Prison Contracts is the corresponding Social Justice mandate. Housing & Rehabilitation Before Incarceration Where Appropriate addresses alternatives where legally and safely justified. Sentencing, Defense & Reentry Reform covers court processes and the transition to community life. Independent Police Oversight & Civilian Response addresses a separate part of the public-safety system.

SOURCES & FURTHER READING

01 · Federal Bureau of Prisons — BOP Ends Use of Privately Owned Prisons; December 1, 2022.

https://www.bop.gov/news/20221201_ends_use_of_privately_owned_prisons.jsp

02 · U.S. Department of Justice Office of Inspector General — Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Monitoring of Contract Prisons; August 11, 2016.

https://www.oversight.gov/reports/review-federal-bureau-prisons-monitoring-contract-prisons

03 · U.S. Government Publishing Office — Executive Order 14006, Reforming Our Incarceration System to Eliminate the Use of Privately Operated Criminal Detention Facilities; January 26, 2021.

https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-202100088/pdf/DCPD-202100088.pdf

04 · Office of the Law Revision Counsel — 18 U.S.C. §4013, executive-order notes recording revocation by Executive Order 14148; January 20, 2025.

https://uscode.house.gov/us/usc/119-121/t18/s4013/

05 · Bureau of Justice Statistics — Prisoners in 2023: Statistical Tables, Table 14; published 2025.

https://bjs.ojp.gov/document/p23st.pdf

06 · Government Accountability Office — Cost of Prisons: Bureau of Prisons Needs Better Data to Assess Alternatives, GAO-08-6; 2007.

https://www.gao.gov/assets/a267843.html

07 · Federal Bureau of Prisons — First Step Act Frequently Asked Questions; statute enacted December 21, 2018.

https://www.bop.gov/inmates/fsa/faq.jsp

08 · Government Accountability Office — Federal Prisons: Improvements Needed to the System Used to Assess and Mitigate Incarcerated People's Recidivism Risk, GAO-26-107268; January 27, 2026.

https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-107268

09 · Federal Register — First Step Act Time Credits: Revisions, 91 FR 55740; August 31, 2026, effective September 30, 2026.

https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-08-31/html/2026-17752.htm

10 · Bureau of Justice Assistance / RAND — Evaluating the Effectiveness of Correctional Education: A Meta-Analysis; August 2013.

https://bja.ojp.gov/library/publications/evaluating-effectiveness-correctional-education-meta-analysis-programs-provide

10 RECOMMENDED ARTICLES, ESSAYS & POLICIES

→ Explore End Private For-Profit Prison Contracts

→ Explore Housing & Rehabilitation Before Incarceration Where Appropriate

→ Explore Sentencing, Defense & Reentry Reform

→ Explore Ferries, Locks & Public Waterways

→ Explore National Climate Adaptation

→ Explore Blue Dogs

→ Explore Libertarians

→ Explore Reformers, Abolitionists & Civil Rights

→ Explore Elite & Industrial Power

→ Explore No Federal Income Tax on the First $80,000

WE ARE ONE.  ·  E PLURIBUS UNUM.