A BADGE IS PUBLIC AUTHORITY. WHO IS IT ACCOUNTABLE TO?

VAULT · 06 JUSTICE AGAINST THE EPSTEINERS

Published by Langhorne P. Breedlove

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 2026 · 2:21 AM ET

Tags: Police Mission · Public Safety · Civil Rights · Accountability · Community Trust

Dear fellow American proletariat: Ask ten people what police are for and you may receive ten answers: stop violence, investigate crime, enforce laws, settle disputes, keep order, respond to emergencies, protect property, help neighbors, maintain traffic safety, and occasionally explain why the parking ticket is not open for philosophical debate. The harder question is what obligations come with the power to stop, search, arrest, and use force against another human being.

The police mission should be examined in three different ways: what law authorizes officers to do, what government institutions instruct them to do, and what people actually experience when they seek protection or are subjected to enforcement. American Proletariat proposes making these responsibilities legible and accountable to the entire public. That is a policy proposition, not a claim that every department operates under one national statute.

ROOTS & THE PUBLIC MISSION

American policing developed through different municipal, county, state, federal, and Tribal arrangements; there is no single founding charter for every department. Early institutions reflected local demands for order and crime control, while many historical practices also enforced discriminatory laws and social hierarchies. Those histories vary by geography and period; reducing every police agency to one origin story obscures both documented abuses and changes in legal authority. (Sources 01, 02)

Contemporary local police departments usually perform patrol, traffic enforcement, criminal investigation, emergency response, and other locally assigned tasks. The Department of Justice's Community Oriented Policing Services Office describes community policing through partnerships, problem solving, and organizational transformation. This is a framework for public service, not a substitute for legally enforceable rules governing arrest and force. (Source 03)

WHO EXACTLY ARE THE POLICE REQUIRED TO PROTECT?

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RULE IS NARROWER THAN THE SLOGAN

In DeShaney v. Winnebago County (1989), the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment generally does not require the state to protect a person from violence committed by private actors. The Court emphasized exceptions involving state-imposed custody and recognized that state tort law may impose different obligations. The case concerned a tragic failure of child protection services; it did not declare the entire public-safety mission optional. (Source 04)

In Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales (2005), the Court held that the plaintiff had no constitutionally protected property interest in police enforcement of her restraining order under the circumstances and Colorado law at issue. This was a dispute about procedural due process and a particular asserted entitlement, not a universal judicial announcement that officers owe no duties under state statutes, departmental policy, or other constitutional rules. (Source 05)

These decisions explain why an individual cannot automatically obtain federal constitutional damages whenever officers fail to prevent private violence. They do not mean government may discriminate in enforcement, use unreasonable force, ignore custodial duties, or violate specific state-law obligations with impunity. Constitutional remedies, state negligence claims, agency discipline, and administrative oversight are separate routes with different requirements.

WHEN POLICE THEMSELVES USE FORCE

In Tennessee v. Garner (1985), the Supreme Court restricted deadly force against a fleeing suspect who does not present the requisite serious threat. In Graham v. Connor (1989), the Court held that excessive-force claims arising from an arrest or investigatory stop are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's objective-reasonableness standard. These rules do not establish that every force incident is lawful; their application depends on the particular facts. (Sources 06, 07)

THE COUNTRY DOES NOT HAVE ONE POLICE DEPARTMENT

The Bureau of Justice Statistics identified approximately 11,800 local police departments employing 473,000 full-time sworn officers in 2020. Nearly half of those departments had fewer than ten full-time-equivalent sworn officers. These are 2020 personnel figures published in 2022, not a live 2026 staffing count, and they exclude other general-purpose agencies such as sheriffs' offices and state police. (Source 08)

This fragmentation matters. A rural sheriff's office, a major city department, a university police unit, and a Tribal agency can have different laws, staffing, geography, training resources, and call volumes. A credible national framework must specify what Congress can regulate, what states can legislate, and what local departments must implement rather than simply issue one order for every uniform.

WHAT THE PUBLIC ACTUALLY EXPERIENCES

The Bureau of Justice Statistics estimated that about 49.2 million U.S. residents age sixteen or older—19 percent of that population—experienced police contact during 2022. Among residents who initiated their most recent contact, almost half said they did so to report a possible crime. These are survey-based measures of contact, not a count of all police incidents or a measure of whether the reported crime was resolved. (Source 09)

The same survey reported that 6 percent of Black respondents, compared with 2 percent of white respondents, experienced the threat or use of nonfatal force during their most recent police-initiated or traffic-accident-related contact. Those categories and the limited type of encounter must remain attached to the comparison. The data describe an observed disparity, not an individualized finding of unlawful conduct in every incident. (Source 09)

National force-data collection also faces coverage limits. In August 2025, the FBI reported that agencies participating in its use-of-force program covered 78 percent of the law-enforcement population for the July 2024–June 2025 window; it did not release national incident counts because its publication threshold of 80 percent coverage was unmet. An accountability system should not mistake missing data for evidence that no incident occurred. (Source 10)

WHAT SHOULD PROTECTION MEAN?

ONE · PROTECT PEOPLE FROM IMMEDIATE HARM

Police should have a clear responsibility to respond lawfully and competently to credible emergencies, prevent imminent violence when feasible, investigate serious offenses, and coordinate medical response. Response expectations need realistic dispatch, staffing, geographic, and safety rules. The mission should distinguish dispatch priorities from guaranteed outcomes: no institution can promise that every emergency will be resolved successfully.

TWO · PROTECT CIVIL RIGHTS WHILE ENFORCING LAW

A stop, search, arrest, or use of force should meet applicable constitutional and statutory standards. Agencies should train and supervise officers on de-escalation, evidence preservation, nondiscrimination, language access, disability accommodation, and the lawful limits of authority. Public safety and due process are not rival departments of government.

THREE · PROTECT THE PUBLIC FROM OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT

Independent review should investigate serious force, discriminatory enforcement, dishonesty in evidence handling, and retaliation against complainants or whistleblowers. Findings should be supported by records, interviews, and fair procedures for all parties. A complaint is not automatically proof of wrongdoing; a badge is not automatically proof of innocence.

FOUR · SEND THE RIGHT RESPONDER

Not every emergency is primarily a criminal-law problem. Jurisdictions can evaluate unarmed civilian responses or co-response teams for appropriate behavioral-health crises, homelessness-related service needs, and nonviolent disputes, while ensuring rapid police and emergency-medical backup for dangerous situations. Dispatch criteria, staff safety, legal authority, liability, and public access must be tested locally. 'Send someone else' is not an implementation plan unless someone else is trained, funded, and actually available.

FIVE · ACCOUNT TO THE WHOLE COMMUNITY

Public agencies should make service standards, staffing, budgets, policies, complaint pathways, stop data, clearance measures, and use-of-force reporting accessible. Community input should include crime victims, residents who rarely encounter police, people who have experienced enforcement, officers and civilian staff, and groups facing specific access barriers. No single stakeholder gets to define the public on everyone else's behalf.

WHAT DOES THE EVIDENCE SAY?

A 2018 National Academies review concluded that some proactive policing strategies show evidence of reducing crime in the short term, particularly when focused on places or problems, while longer-term consequences and community impacts are less certain. The same report cautioned against inferring that evidence for one policing strategy proves all proactive policing beneficial. Effectiveness, constitutional compliance, and legitimacy are related but distinct measurements. (Source 11)

A mission statement alone does not reduce violence. Nor does a purely enforcement-focused scorecard tell us whether vulnerable residents receive help, whether victims feel heard, or whether officers act lawfully. Evaluation should include crime outcomes, response quality, preventable injuries, complaints, and trust while guarding against incentives to downgrade offenses or avoid recording problems.

THE LEGAL PATH

State legislatures and local governments can clarify duties, establish independent review, change training and certification rules, and specify remedies under their respective authority. Congress can legislate within its constitutional powers and attach lawful, clear conditions to relevant federal grants. Courts independently interpret constitutional claims; a national standards document cannot overturn DeShaney or Castle Rock merely by calling the new mission a constitutional right.

Any proposed federal program should distinguish federal officers from state, local, and Tribal policing; respect Tribal sovereignty; address union and civil-service rules lawfully; and preserve due process for officers facing discipline. Separate binding statutory duties from agency service targets, which should be ambitious without claiming a guaranteed personal right to a perfect emergency outcome.

THE ONE-YEAR & TEN-YEAR LEDGER

A national reform cannot be priced with a single per-officer figure. Consider a hypothetical demonstration supporting 100 jurisdictions at $2 million each annually for dispatch modernization, public reporting, outside evaluations, training, and appropriate civilian response pilots. That yields $200 million per year. Add an illustrative $40 million annual national data, oversight, and research budget, for $240 million recurring. Assume $60 million in one-time startup, giving $300 million in first-year gross spending.

With 100 jurisdictions maintained at those assumed costs for ten years, the undiscounted gross total would be $2.46 billion: $2.4 billion in recurring funds and $60 million in startup. This is transparent arithmetic, not a Congressional Budget Office estimate or a prediction about program participation. A 50-jurisdiction version of the same grant would require $100 million in annual jurisdictional grants before national costs; 250 jurisdictions would require $500 million.

The required ten-year fiscal model should include public and private transition costs, training, staffing, emergency-dispatch capacity, equipment, data infrastructure, independent investigative units, civilian response, insurance and litigation, grants, grants already budgeted, local cost sharing, and possible offsets. Potential crime reductions or lower emergency-department costs should be credited only where evidence supports a causal estimate and the savings are actually realizable. Replacing a police call with a civilian response does not inherently erase the total public cost.

WHAT COULD GO WRONG?

Stricter administrative demands can overwhelm small departments unless technical assistance and realistic support accompany them. Civilian-response models may fail if dispatch cannot identify serious threats. Expanded data collection can threaten privacy or become a vehicle for surveillance. A politicized review body can lose public trust by prejudging incidents. Performance incentives can encourage departments to record fewer complaints rather than resolve them.

Some residents will worry that reform weakens deterrence and response to violence; others will worry that stronger policing powers expand unjustified stops and use of force. Those are substantive questions, not character flaws in the people asking them. The solution requires evidence on crime, harm, constitutional compliance, costs, and lived experience—not automatic agreement with whichever side speaks loudest.

MEASURING THE MISSION

Publish response times by call severity and geography; verified violence and property-crime trends; victim-support referrals; stop, search, arrest, and force outcomes; complaints and sustained findings; officer and civilian injuries; clearance methods and limits; independent-investigation timeliness; staff turnover; community survey results; and cost per service delivered. Protect personally identifying information and identify data gaps. Evaluate results by communities served, not merely department-wide averages.

THE POINT

The police mission must be clear enough for residents to understand and specific enough for governments to fund and supervise. Police exercise authority delegated by the public, constrained by law. Their purpose should be safety, lawful service, equal protection, and accountable investigation—not loyalty to an officeholder, a business interest, or an institution's reputation.

If the government gives someone the power to stop you on the street, the government ought to be able to explain exactly what that power is for, when it may be used, and how the public can challenge its misuse.

SOURCES & FURTHER READING

01 · National Research Council — Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence, National Academies Press, 2004.

https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/10419/fairness-and-effectiveness-in-policing-the-evidence

02 · National Museum of African American History and Culture — Policing and Historical Context, historical resources.

https://nmaahc.si.edu/explore/stories

03 · U.S. Department of Justice, COPS Office — History of the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services and the three components of community policing.

https://cops.usdoj.gov/copstimeline

04 · Supreme Court — DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, February 22, 1989.

https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/489/189

05 · Supreme Court — Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, June 27, 2005.

https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/04-278

06 · Supreme Court — Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, March 27, 1985.

https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-471/pdf/USREPORTS-471-1.pdf

07 · Supreme Court — Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, May 15, 1989.

https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/490/386

08 · Bureau of Justice Statistics — Local Police Departments Personnel, 2020, November 17, 2022.

https://bjs.ojp.gov/library/publications/local-police-departments-personnel-2020

09 · Bureau of Justice Statistics — Contacts Between Police and the Public, 2022, October 4, 2024.

https://bjs.ojp.gov/library/publications/contacts-between-police-and-public-2022

10 · Federal Bureau of Investigation — FBI Releases Use-of-Force Data Update, August 28, 2025.

https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-releases-use-of-force-data-update

11 · National Academies — Proactive Policing: Effects on Crime and Communities, 2018.

https://www.nationalacademies.org/projects/DBASSE-CLAJ-14-02/publication/24928

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